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Abstract 
Immigration and its relationship with crime have long been discussed and 
researched in a variety of manners. There has been focus on a wide spectrum of 
research questions concerning the issue, such as public perceptions, immigrant 
perceptions, crime rates and immigration trends. The present article considers the 
crime rates in the areas of the UK with the highest concentrations of first-generation 
immigrants. The areas were gathered using census data and crime rates from police 
recorded statistics. The first-generation immigrants were categorised by their area of 
origin: Europe, Africa and Asia. Quantitative analysis showed that the areas 
containing the highest concentration of first-generation immigrants saw a drop in 
crime compared to the areas with the second highest concentration. Results also 
showed that certain immigrant groups combined in high concentrations make for 
lower crime rates. Such findings suggest that there may be a cultural aspect at play, 
and begs further research. 
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Introduction 
Often the discussion of immigration and crime is conducted in a political 
environment, or is at the very least politicised in some way. This is problematic for 
those who wish to study the relationship between the two meaningfully with a view of 
attracting the attention of those who may contribute to and act on the research 
evidence. Of those are Ignatans and Zielinski (2015) who originally produced and 
presented the basis for the work discussed in this article with a view to influence 
actual policing practice. The researchers intended to be of those who contribute to 
the body of knowledge already established in a manner that informs progressive 
steps in the direction that the evidence suggests, regardless of how political it is 
assumed to be. It is not politics, it is practical academia. 
 
There exists general consensus as to some basic facts about the immigrant-crime 
nexus. Immigration does not appear to be linked particularly strongly with an 
increase in crime; in fact, the reverse is often seen to be true. For example, areas in 
the US with higher concentrations of recent immigrants were found to have reduced 
levels of homicide and robbery (Lyons, Vélez & Santoro, 2013). Using police 
recorded data in Chicago, Sampson (2006) found that first-generation Mexican 
immigrants to the USA to be 45% less likely to commit a violent offence than third-
generation Americans, the most commonly chosen option in US censuses (Gallup, 
2001). This may demonstrate a difference between the most common first-
generation immigrants and the common American public. Additionally, Vélez (2009) 
investigated the level of recent immigrants in areas classified as being of low, high 
and extreme economic disadvantage, based on census data, and the homicide rates 
of the areas, based on police recorded statistics. Areas of a low disadvantage 
appeared not to benefit at all from high concentrations of recent immigration, with the 
homicide rate rising as the concentration of immigrants did across these areas. 
Areas of extreme disadvantage showed the opposite, with their homicide rate 
lowering the higher the influx of immigration they saw. This Vélez ascribes to there 
being opportunity available for the recently arrived immigrants to contribute to a 
failing area, as opposed to arriving in an area of low disadvantage where 
development is not immediately necessary or is a more complex undertaking. 
Research from Los Angeles, using police data, provided similar results in that more 
recent Latino immigration, as identified by census data, had some pacifying impact 
on Latino violence (Feldmeyer, 2009), suggesting that more immigrants from 
culturally similar regions to those already occupying the area reduces the rates of 
violence. 
 
A somewhat similar picture is painted in the European literature. In the UK, the 
impact of two waves of immigration on crime was examined – asylum seekers of the 
1990s and EU8 workers from 2004 onwards (Bell et al., 2013). There appeared to be 
very little impact on crime by the wave of EU8 workers, although the wave of asylum 
seekers saw an increase in property crime. The authors considered economic 
situation as a potential explanation for the property crime increase, in that the asylum 
seekers were economically disadvantaged due to their status compared to the EU 
workers. On the other hand, of the cities in England with the highest and lowest 
levels of immigration between 2001-2011, those with the highest were more likely to 
see a decrease in violent crime and those with the lowest, an increase (Ignatans & 
Matthews, in press). The influx of immigration in that period was most significantly 
associated with a reduction in common assault and robbery, with the greatest impact 
on these attributable to European immigrants. In Spain, assessing the impact of 
immigration over a similar timescale to the previous study, the origin of the immigrant 
population proved to be important, with Spanish-speaking immigrants having a much 
more preferable impact on crime than those of other origins (Alonso-Borrego et al., 
2012). This may be ascribed to the ‘Latino Paradox’ as was identified in Sampson’s 
previously discussed research, that Latino immigrants have a reducing effect on 
crime rates. It may also be linked to cultural similarity between the host and 
immigrant populations. The Spanish-speaking immigrants undoubtedly would have a 
less difficult experience integrating and living in a new country with a new culture if 
the culture reflects their own. This easier experience may contribute to that 
immigrant group’s lower estimated crime rates. Finally, Nunziata’s (2015) large-scale 
European study of the effect of immigration on crime concluded that there is indeed 
a positive relationship between the two, though it becomes non-significant when 
controlling for unobservable regional factors, which lead the author to conclude that 
these factors may be more influential than the characteristics of newcomers.  
 
Although Sampson’s (2006) theory that immigration into US cities has a positive 
effect due to a dissolution of a criminogenic ‘street culture’ has become increasingly 
popular, perhaps culture in this sense is too broad a construct to be helpful for policy 
purposes. For it to do so, one would have to be intimately aware of the workings of 
culture and how that influenced behaviour, and then be able to predict how that 
culture might respond to others. Perhaps a more useful approach is that of Alonso-
Borrego (2012) and Ignatans & Matthews (in press), whose research found that 
immigration from areas with similar cultures to the host has a benign impact on 
crime. In this sense, culture is a more tangible entity, as culture is generally easier to 
identify in the broader sense than to deconstruct.  
 
The popular economic argument, as seen in Bell et al.’s study (2010), is present in 
other research that has not been featured in this brief breakdown of the literature 
(Bircan & Hooghe, 2011; Bell & Machin, 2013; Jaitman & Machin, 2013), though may 
not be applicable given the research that is to follow. Finally, immigrant 
concentration appears to have a favourable impact on crime, as in Feldmeyer’s 
(2009) study, among others (Martinez Jr & Stowell, 2012; Wadsworth, 2010). This 
may be similar to the cultural argument however, in that a high concentration of 
immigrants would result in their living in a familiar culture, if where they live is 
populated largely by people of similar backgrounds and areas of origin.  
Should similarity of cultures be regarded as a crucial factor in the immigration-crime 
nexus, the next logical question would be to ask how immigrants are policed given 
their different expectations of policing? There seems to be multiple studies 
conducted across the globe that have investigated how well immigrants trust the 
police, indicating the immigrants’ feelings towards whatever policing strategy they 
are subjected to. Chinese immigrants in Chicago were found not to be particularly 
critical of police (Wu, Sun & Smith, 2011), in Britain first-generation immigrants were 
found to lower levels of trust in the police than the host population (Los et al., 2017), 
as reflected in Belgium, where Moroccan and Turkish immigrants also had much less 
trust of the police than the Belgians (Van Craen, 2012). The depth of the research in 
the area is seemingly fathomless, and so such a brief snapshot will be used to 
demonstrate that indeed, immigrant relationships with policing are not entirely 
predictable, and may depend very much upon the host nation, its culture, the culture 
of the immigrants and, most importantly, the policing strategy. Such potential 
fluctuation would lead one to focus on the only aspect influenceable – policing.     
 
In Australia, procedural justice was tested as a method of improving immigrant trust 
in police (Murphy & Mazerolle, 2016). Procedural justice is the following of four key 
principles, neutrality, respect, fairness and voice (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). The testing 
of the practice in ‘random breath testing’, a common police procedure in Australia 
whereby police randomly test drivers for alcohol levels, found that immigrants and 
natives both responded with higher reported levels of trust. However, the script given 
to the police in the experimental group was seven times longer than their normal 
procedure, leading one to consider whether such action is worth the countless extra 
hours of police attention if it were to be adopted in other policing scenarios. In 
counties across the USA, Latinos were surveyed, most of which immigrants, asking 
their trust of police (Theodore & Habans, 2016). It was found that Latino immigrants 
were less likely to trust and cooperate with police due to their worry that the police 
would investigate their citizenship. The response to this to increase trust and 
cooperation, and therefore build a safer community, is clearly for police to not be 
involved in policing immigration. As before, this seems untenable. For the police to 
sacrifice carrying out their duty in order to improve how they are viewed would be to 
sacrifice the very concept of policing. Both these positions are addressed by Skogan 
(2009) as main barriers to policing immigrant communities – a lack of trust due to 
unfair treatment and a lack of trust due to enforcement of immigration laws. It seems 
as though a policing strategy tailored to areas containing a high concentration of 
immigrants would need to tackle the problem of trust and be aware of the importance 
of culture, without overworking or undermining the police as they currently are.  
 
It is within this context that the present research was carried out. For practical 
purposes, the issue of concentration of immigrants of similar and diverse origins is 
crucial.  The impact of concentration of first-generation immigrants from different 
countries of origin on crime rates in the UK was examined and reported on below.  
 
Methodology  
 
Data were gathered on first-generation immigrants, consistent with other studies in 
this area, using UK census data from 2011 which allows examination of one’s place 
of birth as opposed to one’s ethnicity – a characteristic not indicative of immigration 
status but often viewed in such light. Recorded crime rate statistics were gathered 
from police recorded data for 2011 (Home Office, 2011).  
 
Recorded crime data were selected for a number of factors. Such data allow a focus 
on the offender, not the victim, as is also crucial in research on immigrant 
concentration and crime.  Recorded crime data are also well-suited for analysis of 
general crime trends. However, police data also present many drawbacks and 
difficulties. The police practice of recording crime changed in 2002 with the 
introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard. This change has since made 
comparing police data pre- and post-2002 difficult. Most worrying though, is that the 
police’s admission of ‘massaging’ crime figures led to the data they produce being 
stripped of the ‘national statistics’ status – a gold standard (Travis, 2014) – which 
results in numerous impacts on the resulting figures. Police data, then, must be 
interpreted carefully.  
 
Further consideration of police data leads one to arguments that the legal definitions 
of offences and the statistical understanding of them are not sufficiently married and 
that external factors also have significant impact on police data, such as medical 
improvements leading to potential homicides turning into lesser offences (Blumstein 
& Wallman, 2000). Still, despite its setbacks, police data provide the most suitable 
data for present purposes, particularly for offences often missed by victimisation 
surveys, and a focus on the offender and their area, as is essential when assessing 
immigrant concentration’s effect on crime trends.  
 
Crime types were examined and grouped as ‘violent’ if they were to directly impact 
the victim (e.g. assault, wounding), ‘property’ if the victim was likely to suffer financial 
loss in absentia and ‘vehicle’ largely being thefts of motor vehicles or possessions in 
them as well as criminal damage to vehicles. These categories were used as 
representations of that crime type, allowing for better analysis of trends. First-
generation immigrants were grouped as European, African and Asian, depending on 
their place of birth. Immigrant concentration in the UK was determined within Middle 
Level Super Output Areas (MSOAs). MSOAs are a collection of Census Output 
Areas (the most disaggregated level for census estimates, made from adjacent 
postcodes and designed to have similar demographic characteristics and social 
homogeneity). Like Census Output Areas, MSOAs are designed to be of similar 
population sizes (a mean population of 7910 (ONS, 2014)), that allow for more 
appropriate statistical analyses across the UK in the case of the present study.  
 
 
 
Analysis  
MSOAs were divided into deciles and ordered by the percentage population of each 
group of first-generation immigrants relevant to the graph. In these deciles, the 
proportion of violent, property and vehicle offences were also analysed, alongside 
the proportion of each group of first-generation immigrants (European, African, 
Asian) attributed to each decile. One immigrant category is shown per graph for 
easier visual understanding.  
 
Perhaps a little further explanation of the graphs is necessary here. The immigrant 
line in each graph is interesting in itself because it shows how immigrants cluster in 
particular areas. If an immigrant group were distributed evenly across areas the line 
would be straight. To the extent to which they depart from linearity immigrants are 
concentrated in particular areas. It is obvious that the Asian population is most 
concentrated in particular areas and the relative concentration of the different groups 
could be quantified as Gini coefficients but that is not the central purpose of this 
paper. The aspect of the graphs to which the reader is directed is (looking at Figure 
1 for illustration) that as the proportion of European immigrants in an area increases, 
crime does too until the concentration is high, at which point the relationship 
reverses, with more immigrants being associated with less crime. This pattern is 
repeated for immigrants of African origin but not for immigrants of Asian origin.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Proportional distribution of first generation European immigrants and recorded 
violent, property and vehicle crimes in England and Wales, 2011. Sources: UK 
Census 2011, Office for National Statistics. 
 
  
Figure 2 
Proportional distribution of first generation African immigrants and recorded violent, 
property and vehicle crimes in England and Wales, 2011. Sources: UK Census 
2011, Office for National Statistics. 
 
 
  
Figure 3 
Proportional distribution of first generation Asian immigrants and recorded violent, 
property and vehicle crimes in England and Wales, 2011. Sources: UK Census 
2011, Office for National Statistics. 
  
 
Let us now clarify the picture outlined above with more detail. First, the graphs 
demonstrate the strong concentration of each immigrant group. 33% of European 
immigrants (Figure 1) in the UK occupy 10% of the MSOAs, 44% of African 
immigrants (Figure 2) occupy 10%, and 47% of Asian immigrants (Figure 3) occupy 
10%. Each immigrant group sees a sharp increase around the 8th decile of their 
proportion in those areas, indicating that immigrant groups across the UK are by no 
means distributed evenly and that most areas have little to none. Each graph also 
includes the proportion of violent, property and vehicle crime in the deciles. All types 
of crime remained consistently low, below or around 10% per decile, for all immigrant 
groups up to the 7th decile, showing no particular proclivity for any crime type of any 
immigrant group. For European and African immigrants, the 8th and 9th deciles saw a 
sharp increase of all crime types, but then a sudden decrease in the 10th decile. 
However, for Asian immigrants, the increase in all crime types continued to steadily 
increase until the 9th and 10th deciles, where crime spikes. This may seem as though 
concentration of Asian immigrants is therefore uniformly indicative of increased crime 
rates, though it is worth noting that when considering the proportion of Asian 
immigrants and the proportion of crime, the greatest difference occurs when the 
proportion of Asian immigrants is at its highest (Table 1.). This is also true of 
European and African immigrants. In short, the concentration of immigrants seems to 
have a more positive impact on all crime types in the areas of most immigration.  
Table 1 
Proportion of first generation European, African and Asian immigrants versus the 
proportion of crime in 9th and 10th area deciles by immigration, 2011. Sources: UK 
Census 2011, Office for National Statistics. 
 
The second stage of analysis uses only the areas that fell under top deciles by each 
immigrant group population, i.e. the 10% of areas containing most European, African 
and Asian immigrants respectively. The areas shared by immigrant groups (e.g. 
areas which were in the top decile for European immigrants and African immigrants) 
are displayed as separate categories and named after all populations that were 
prevalent in those areas in such a way (European and African; Asian and African; 
European and Asian; European, Asian and African). The total number of all areas 
that fell under either criterion was 1307. The average rates of violent, property and 
vehicle crimes for the areas in each category were calculated and indexed against 
 European African Asian 
9th Decile 10th 
Decile 
9th Decile 10th 
Decile 
9th Decile 10th 
Decile 
Violent 
Crime 
1.103447 
 
2.48955 
 
1.489531 
 
4.039594 
 
1.5184 
 
3.031393 
 
Property 
Crime 
1.254948 
 
2.744857 
 
1.560526 
 
5.17796 
 
1.572494 
 
3.400587 
 
Vehicle 
Crime 
1.375589 
 
3.007701 
 
1.560329 
 
4.225034 
 
1.594958 
 
3.524715 
 
the absolute average crime rates across England and Wales (N=7201) which were 
treated as 100. The average rates for all areas in the top deciles (N=1307) are also 
displayed.  
 
Figure 4 
Recorded violent, property and vehicle crimes in areas that fall under the top decile 
by either European, African and Asian first generation immigration. England and 
Wales average indexed as 100. Sources: UK Census 2011, Office for National 
Statistics. 
 
 
As is visible in Figure 4, the areas with the lowest average crime rates across the 
board are those shared by European and African immigrants, which is also the most 
common type of mixed area, with 214 MLSOAs falling into this category. Of the 
mixed areas, “European + Asian” has the highest crime rates and is by far the least 
common mix, with just 87 MLSOAs falling into the 10th decile by both of these 
immigration categories. Interestingly, when two or more immigrant groups are 
prevalent in an area, the resulting rates of crime in those areas tend to fluctuate 
somewhere in-between the rates of the areas populated by the same groups 
separately. For example, the Violent, Property and Vehicle crime rates in areas 
labelled as “African + Asian” are higher than those of areas labelled just as “African” 
but lower than those of just “Asian”. However, this rule does not seem to apply to the 
mix of European and African immigrants, where areas with such immigrant mix saw 
lower rates of crime than either European or African areas separately. In addition, 
crime rates for all crime types in such areas were much lower than the overall 
average. This drop in crime rates should be viewed as very favourable and 
academically intriguing, and the examination of the relationship between the two 
could be logically considered as a strong factor in the decline worth investigating 
further. Areas with European and Asian immigrants being the least common and 
having the highest of crime rates would also suggest that the relationship between 
the two populations may be criminally unfavourable and again would make for 
compelling further research.  
 
Conclusion  
It is a common perception that immigration is linked with increased crime rates. Most 
literature on the topic, however, refutes that simple view. The present research is no 
exception. First-generation immigrants from Europe, Africa and Asia were analysed 
using UK census data to establish the areas in which they are most concentrated. 
Police data were used to establish recorded crime statistics in those areas. This 
showed that proportionately, the areas with the most first-generation immigrants with 
a particular area of origin saw lower crime rates than areas with fewer first-
generation immigrants. Sharp increases in crime rates in the 8th and 9th deciles of 
areas by the levels of first-generation immigrant populations and the sudden decline 
(excluding areas with Asian immigration, though proportionately still boasting low 
crime rates) in the 10th may lead one to speculate as to what triggers the change 
from 7th to 8th deciles, and that from 9th to 10th. Perhaps the implied homogeneity of 
such areas leads to more harmonious living environments, but only for the highest 
concentrations of first-generation immigrants, suggesting that there may be a level of 
proportion that has optimal effects on crime.  
The combination of high levels of European and African immigrants, however, saw 
the lowest crime rates of any group, singular or mixed, and was the most common 
type of area with more than one prevalent immigrant population. The theory of 
proportion outlined above would still be applicable, but practically one may be more 
inclined to suggest that the combination of those immigrant populations in the UK 
could have a positive impact on the host population as well as each other, enough to 
encourage such a mix to occur more frequently. This is at this stage speculation and 
requires more research. The areas with the highest levels of both European and 
Asian first-generation immigrants were by far the least prevalent and saw the highest 
crime rates. One may speculate that some aspect(s) of the two populations’ lifestyle 
causes tension. This is assuming, as in the previous case, that the factors involved 
in the impact on crime rates are the same that impact how common a mix of the two 
immigrant groups is. Though again, this is merely the subject of speculation and 
certainly invites more research in the area.  
 
How the different immigrant groups coexist and the impact that has on crime rates, 
as mentioned above, may be a particular concern with regard to policing practice. In 
the areas where there are high concentrations of immigrant groups that seem to 
have some connection to higher crime rates, the approach to policing may benefit 
from considering the potentially problematic conflict. The work of Alonso-Borrego 
(2012) indicated that contrasting cultures are more likely to see higher crime rates. 
This idea may be coupled well with the work of Los et al. (2017), that demonstrates 
the differences in victim judgements of offence seriousness from first generation 
immigrants. The differences seem to be culturally based, at least in part, where they 
are found. Reporting of crimes to police was also examined and found to differ 
across immigrant groups. These differences in the relationship certain immigrants 
have with crime may be of interest for operational policing. How one might effectively 
police these areas, consisting of people from conflicting backgrounds, each with their 
own culturally different relationship with crime, would be different from policing an 
area with few immigrants. The present authors would advocate some form of 
culturally aware policing, with police who have a good (preferably personal) 
understanding of the culture of the people they are to be policing. This approach 
would consider the needs of the people being policed, which would be important for 
areas with a high concentration of one group of first generation immigrants and even 
more so for those with a mix.  
 
Clearly, how concentration of first-generation immigrants in the UK affects crime 
rates is complex, as demonstrated here. Even more complex is the effect of the first-
generation immigrants of different origins on each other and how that in turn affects 
crime rates, even more dramatically than singularly, in both directions. The picture 
painted in this article, alongside the previous work briefly summarised, is not a 
complete one, but also not without practical implications. As the academic cliché 
goes, further research is necessary.  
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